Political life
The Russian federal system usually operates in a highly centralised and vertical manner, leaving little real decision-making autonomy to cities and regions. However, it is this local level which, during the summer of 2019, became the new reference scale for political activism and citizen involvement in view of the regional elections to be held in September (choice of governors and legislative assemblies in certain subjects of the Federation). In the main cities of the country, and especially in Moscow, the summer was marked by events taking place every weekend. What the participants contested was the refusal by the Electoral Commission to validate the candidacies in these same elections of members of the liberal opposition known as "outside the system", whose most illustrious leader is the lawyer and blogger Alexei Navalny. It is Moscow, a young, dynamic and politicised city, which is becoming the nerve centre of the protests: on some weekends there are up to 60,000 demonstrators, a particularly high number, which is in line with the large waves of protests in 2011 (for the cancellation of parliamentary elections deemed irregular and the withdrawal of Vladimir Putin's presidential candidacy) and 2018 (against the pension reform announced by the executive). It is moreover because of this reform, which made the ruling party (United Russia) unusually unpopular, that the latter did not officially present any candidate for the 2019 local elections in Moscow. The strategy adopted is similar to that used by Vladimir Putin during his re-election to the 2018 presidential elections. Candidates affiliated to United Russia have in fact presented themselves as "independents", so as not to be disadvantaged by the party's declining popularity, even though they benefit from its networks and financial support. The particularly calm demonstrations in the summer of 2019 were violently repressed by the police. Several key figures of the movement as well as personalities from the world of culture were arrested on fabricated bases, triggering waves of support both inside and outside the country.
On the political side, with its candidates prevented from running, the "out of system" opposition more or less aligned behind Navalny implemented an alternative strategy: the "intelligent vote". By this manoeuvre, it called on voters to vote for the so-called "systemic" opposition candidate (usually from the Communist or Nationalist Party) best placed to beat the candidate in power (from United or "independent" Russia). Apart from a very low turnout, the "smart vote" strategy proved to be a real success in Moscow (where United Russia lost one third of its seats in the city assembly), but less so in the regions, which are less exposed to opposition communication. Thus, the election results only confirm the major imbalance between the major cities and the Russian province. But they also show, particularly through the Moscow example, that certain themes (pensions, police violence, local involvement) have the power to crystallise around them an opposition that transcends the usual political and generational cleavages and proves to be a considerable adversary for the ruling power.Social developments
Despite its (well-deserved) reputation as a European city and a Russian bridge to and from the outside world, St. Petersburg, Vladimir Putin's former fiefdom, remains more immobile than Moscow. The outgoing governor of United Russia was re-elected there on massive charges of fraud, and the protest certainly did not reach the level of Moscow. The country "with two capitals" is thus gradually abandoning its traditional bicephaly, while Moscow is "on the move" and centralises political activity and activism, university and innovation centres and, above all, economic growth. For the rural exodus is a phenomenon of dramatic proportions that is gangrene in the Russian provinces and beyond: people from all over the former USSR rush to Moscow to work. And the St. Petersburgers themselves admit that their city has lost its economic attractiveness compared to Moscow, where it is still possible to find qualified jobs, while the former imperial capital has few opportunities to offer young graduates. Russia is therefore gradually transforming itself into a macrocephalous country, completely polarised around its capital, which is constantly expanding to accommodate new arrivals. But by all accounts, the city's unbridled growth makes it unliveable: Moscow has become an impersonal and oppressive place for its inhabitants, a permanent race for success. In Russia, for example, it is said that one goes "to St. Petersburg for love, joy and life, and to Moscow for money". This extreme way of life is wearisome and so, even if the phenomenon is still statistically imperceptible, a reverse movement is slowly beginning: more and more young Russian urbanites are choosing to "go back to the land". Sometimes a little mystical, in search of new professional opportunities, out of ecological commitment or simply because of fatigue, they move to the provinces to revive farming communities and enjoy the calm and vastness of the Russian countryside.
Thus, whether in terms of political or "lifestyle" choices, today's Russia is in the midst of a generational upheaval characterized by the growing visibility and weight of the "creative classes". The term refers to a young, cultured and connected population which, coming from a generation that knew little or nothing about the USSR, has lived more than half of its life under Vladimir Putin and is directly affected by the country's political orientations. It is this generation that is mobilising the streets of Moscow and refusing to be swallowed up in the race for the country's competitiveness: slowly but surely, gentrification is coming to the East.Cultural production
In the artistic field, a form of Russian-style Ostalgy has emerged in recent years. The Soviet and 1990s aesthetics, despite the dramatic memories with which it is sometimes associated, has become a sought-after element of an alternative fashion that has been able to seduce and impose itself like a canon, in the East as well as in the West. This cultural reinvention is also the product of this young generation and its quest for a demanding identity, between mass culture, European references and the valorisation of a Russian particularism. Today, the flocked hammer and sickle t-shirts of designer star Gosha Rubschinsky, the cold-wave band Motorama's cold-wave or the punk musical Leto
by the playwright under house arrest Kirill Serebrennikov have toured the world. This artistic exaltation is part of a major Russian stylistic revival, which, although it is widely appropriated by the country's teenagers and young people, is still mostly a matter for connoisseurs and young hipsters in the West. In the same way, the productions of the Russian 19th century or the Silver Age were for a long time chic and elitist references.But the country is also keen to make itself accessible to a wider public, and this time the impetus comes from the state. The Universiades in Kazan in 2013, the Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014 and, to top it all off, the 2018 Football World Cup have highlighted the crucial place of sport in Russia's branding strategy: it is both a diplomatic lever and a marketing tool for tourism. The aim is to prove that Russia is a country capable of surprising and seducing foreigners. While a disaster was expected due to the many scandals (both corruption and delays in stadium construction) that marred the preparations, the organisation of the World Cup was a success overall and helped demystify Russia in the minds of many fans.
Generally speaking, even though American fast-food and fast-fashion chains can be found in all the major cities, Russia was thus able to negotiate its transition to modernity on its own terms. Beyond its artistic effervescence that reinvents national cultural codes, the country has also been able to organise a Russian response to the globalisation of services and techniques. It is for example the RuNet, the Russian segment of the Internet, which directly challenges the hegemony of the GAFA by offering alternatives adapted to the practices of the Russian public and to the particularities of the language. The search engine Yandex or the social network Vkontakte are much more popular in the country than their Google and Facebook equivalents. Overall, it is therefore this search for sovereignty and individuality which, for better or worse, conditions both Russia's attitude on the international scene and the country's internal developments.
