An old idea
The idea of a navigable canal to link the two oceans was born early on in the minds of engineers the world over. In 1529, Alvaro de Saavedra suggested linking the Chagres and Grande rivers to create a 3 m-deep canal. The work was deemed too extensive and the project abandoned. In 1534, Charles V ordered a topographical survey, but the technological means were still insufficient to make the isthmus a reality. In 1556, a new study in Nicaragua commissioned by Philip II came to the same conclusion. Faced with this failure, the sovereign, who also feared that foreign powers would use a future canal to reach the Spanish colonies, declared: "God has marked his will to see the two oceans separated by a continuous isthmus [... ]. It is forbidden on pain of death to concern oneself with the opening of any new routes between the two oceans". In the early 19thcentury, the German naturalist Alexandre de Humboldt proposed nine routes, via the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in Mexico, the Río San Juan in Nicaragua or through the thick jungle of the Darién... Other projects were proposed by Americans, English, Dutch... but it was the French who embarked on the adventure, as recounted in the Canal Museum in Casco Viejo.
An arm wrestle against nature
To finance this pharaonic project, the Compagnie universelle du canal interocéanique was created in 1880. The prestige of Ferdinand de Lesseps, "Winner of Suez", enabled him to gain the confidence of thousands of private subscribers. Despite the opinion of renowned engineers who recommended a canal with locks, Lesseps embarked on the construction of a "level" canal like the one in Suez. The work, which began in 1881, was supposed to last eight years. However, the climate and soil are not the same in the tropics as in the Egyptian desert. The breakthrough of the cordillera advances with difficulty in the volcanic rock and the enthusiasm of the beginning is quickly transformed into bitterness. Engineers and workers, who came from the West Indies and Europe, could not stand the heat and humidity, while the torrential rains from April to December caused devastating landslides. But it was mainly mosquitoes that caused the greatest damage by carrying diseases that were not well known at the time, malaria and yellow fever. The death toll was very high, 22,000, or more than half of the workers and engineers. In addition to this human tragedy, the poor administration of the company and its financial difficulties put an end to the project in 1889, causing one of the most serious political and financial scandals of the Third Republic in France.
After many twists and turns, the United States bought the rights and properties of the company for 40 million dollars and opted this time for the construction of a canal with locks. Relaunched in 1904, the construction site employed 75,000 people, the majority of whom were of Afro-Caribbean origin. Before starting the excavation work, the Americans' priority was to sanitize the region by installing mosquito nets, eliminating stagnant water and fumigating the swampy areas... while recommending quinine to the workers as a preventive and curative measure. These measures were rewarded by the eradication of yellow fever and malaria. However, the construction site still claimed more than 5,000 victims in ten years, bringing the total number of deaths to more than 27,000 for all the work since 1881. The canal was completed in 1914, just as Europe was entering the war.
Strategic sovereignty
It was not until noon on December 31, 1999, that the Panamanian flag was raised for the first time on the building of the canal administration. A historic date that ensures the transfer of the zone, as well as the management and operation of the inter-oceanic route to the Panamanian authorities, after 85 years of North American concession. And it was necessary to fight for Washington to accept the restitution of this zone, which, in addition to the benefits generated by maritime trade, has also served as a bridgehead for multiple interventions on the continent, especially in the 1980s. Today, the signing of the Carter-Torrijos treaty that began the process in 1979 seems a long way off, as do international fears that the Panamanians would be unable to manage the canal. The ambitious challenge of validating its first place on the international maritime trade scene has been met.
XXL growth under threat
In 2022, the Canal Authority and its 9,000 employees recorded over 500 million tonnes crossing the isthmus aboard 14,239 ships, or 39 per day! Since the inauguration of the enlarged waterway in 2016, after nine years of work, the largest container ships in the post-panamax class - with up to 14,000 containers - have been passing through the newAgua Clara and Cocoli locks. And they sometimes have only a few centimetres of clearance on either side when they pass through. Discover this epic story at the site of the first Miraflores locks, where a Visitors' Centre has been set up. While this technological prowess temporarily ensures Panamanian hegemony, the canal's future cannot be written without taking new threats into account...
Water, a key element in the workings of this artery, has become a major issue in the context of global warming, raising questions about its future. 5.2 billion cubic meters of water are needed to keep it running smoothly. Droughts have already forced ships, on several occasions, to lighten their cargo for the crossing. Freshwater resources could therefore have an impact on the 4% of the world's maritime trade that transits this route. Pumping, reservoirs or seawater desalination are under study. And while the Nicaragua alternative seems to have been archived, new competition is emerging in the form of new Arctic passages.
